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Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 13 (Feb. 27, 2014)1 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: NRS 50.125  
Summary 
 
The question at issue is “whether a witness's review of purportedly privileged documents 
prior to testifying constitutes a waiver of any privilege under NRS 50.125,  such that the adverse 
party may demand production, be allowed to inspect the documents, cross-examine the witness 
on the contents, and admit the evidence for purposes of impeachment.” 
 
Disposition 
 
When invoked at a hearing, NRS 50.125 requires disclosure of any document used to 
refresh the witness's recollection before or while testifying – regardless of privilege. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Steven Jacobs, the real party in interest, filed a breach of employment contract action 
against petitioners Las Vegas Sands Corp., Sands China Ltd., and non-party Sheldon Adelson, 
the CEO of Las Vegas Sands (collectively, Sands), arising out of Jacobs's termination as 
president and CEO of Sands' Macau operations.  
Sands motioned to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction, but was denied.  
Sands then filed and was granted a writ of mandamus that directed the district court to revisit the 
issue of personal jurisdiction, hold an evidentiary hearing, and issue its findings. As a result of 
Sands' alleged misconduct in the ensuing jurisdictional discovery process, the district court sua 
sponte ordered a separate evidentiary hearing to consider sanctions. 	  
During the sanctions hearing, Jacobs cross-examined a former Las Vegas Sands attorney, 
Justin Jones.  Noting that Jones's testimony had been fairly precise, Jacobs asked if Jones had 
reviewed his records before arriving at court. Jones responded that he had reviewed billing 
records and emails that had refreshed his recollection of relevant dates and the timing of events. 
Jacobs argued at the hearing that these records were openly discoverable under NRS 50.125.2 
Sands objected, claiming work product doctrine and the attorney-client privilege. 
The district court suggested that Jacobs file a motion requesting that the documents be 
produced and indicated that it would hold argument and rule on the discovery issue at a later 
date. Yet, without deciding the discovery issue, the district court filed its order imposing 
sanctions on Sands.  Two month’s later, Jacobs filed his motion to compel production of the 
documents Jones used to refresh his recollection claiming Jones had thereby waived his 
privileges. Sands opposed the motion, arguing that NRS 50.125(1) does not require automatic 
disclosure of privileged documents but instead requires a balancing test to determine whether 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  By Craig Friedel. 
2  NEV. REV. STAT. 50.135(1) (2013) states, “If a witness uses a writing to refresh his or her memory, either before 
or while testifying, an adverse party is entitled: (a) To have it produced at the hearing; (b) To inspect it; (c) To cross-
examine the witness thereon; and (d) To introduce in evidence those portions which relate to the testimony of the 
witness for the purpose of affecting the witness's credibility.” 
	  
disclosure is in the interests of justice. Sands also argued, alternatively, that the rights provided 
for in NRS 50.125(1) must be exercised at the hearing at which the witness testifies regarding the 
documents. After hearing the arguments in chambers, the district court entered an order 
compelling Sands to produce the documents but stayed it pending these writ proceedings. 
 
Discussion 
 
Although discovery matters typically are addressed to the district court's sound discretion 
and unreviewable by writ petition, the Court chose to exercise its discretion to consider this writ 
petition because the order at issue compelled disclosure of purportedly privileged information.3 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The parties disputed the district court's interpretation of NRS	  50.125. Such interpretation is 
a question of law subject to the Court’s de novo review, even when arising in a writ proceeding.4 
 
When invoked at a hearing, NRS 50.125 requires disclosure of any document used to refresh the 
witness's recollection before or while testifying, regardless of privilege  
 
The court was required to first determine an issue of first impression: “whether the 
Nevada Legislature intended all writings, including privileged documents, to be produced for 
impeachment purposes when a witness uses the document to refresh his or her recollection prior 
to testifying” under NRS 50.125. 
Sands argued privileges apply at all stages of all proceedings except where they are 
"relaxed by a statute or procedural rule applicable to the specific situation"5 and that NRS 
50.125 does not specifically do so.  Alternatively, Sands argued that NRS 50.125 only provides 
that an adverse party is entitled to a document at the hearing.  Jacobs asserted that NRS 
50.125 makes no exception for privileged documents and, thus, applies to them. Additionally, 
Jacobs argues that NRS 50.125 lacks the discretionary prong that its federal counterpart6 
contains, which suggests disclosure is mandatory.  
Looking at the language of NRS 50.125, the Court concluded that the language "a 
writing" is ambiguous in that it could refer to both privileged and unprivileged writings or only 
to unprivileged writings because a “privilege,” under NRS 47.020, applies "at all stages of all 
proceedings" except where it is "relaxed.” Thus, the Court looked at the statute's legislative 
history. 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Aspen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 128 Nev. __, __ , 289 P.3d 201, 204 (2012) ("[W]rit relief 
may be available when it is necessary to prevent discovery that would cause privileged information to irretrievably 
lose its confidential nature and thereby render a later appeal ineffective."). 
4 Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 198, 179 P.3d 556, 559 (2008). 
5 NEV. REV. STAT. 47.020(1)(a) (2013).	  
6 FED. R. EVID. 612. 
NRS 50.125 differs significantly from FRE 612  
 
FRE 612(a) was amended to make production of writings used by a witness to refresh 
recollection before testifying subject to the discretion of the court "in the interests of justice, as is 
the case under existing federal law."7 However, NRS 50.125 was codified without this 
discretionary prong.  The Court found this discrepancy significant and held that without such 
language, Nevada district courts lack discretion to halt the disclosure of privileged documents 
under NRS 50.125.   
This is supported by that fact that since the passage of FRE 612 forty years ago, the 
Nevada Legislature has had the option to bring NRS 50.125 in line with the federal rule by 
adding a discretionary prong, but has not.  Additionally, allowing privilege to prevail during a 
witness's testimony would place an unfair disadvantage on the adverse party by encouraging 
witnesses to use privileged writings to refresh recollection in an attempt to shield themselves 
from any meaningful cross-examination on his or her testimony utilizing the privileged material.8  
Therefore, the Court held that, “when invoked at a hearing . . . NRS 50.125 requires 
disclosure of any document used to refresh the witness's recollection before or while testifying, 
regardless of privilege.”  The Court emphasized, however, that the required disclosure of 
purportedly privileged documents requires an appropriate and timely request under NRS 50.125. 
 
The district court abused its discretion when it ordered the production of purportedly privileged 
documents because the request was untimely and Jones's credibility was no longer at issue  
 
Sands argued that NRS 50.125 was designed to ensure that an adverse party has a full and 
fair opportunity to test the witness's credibility. Sands pointed out that this purpose was moot 
when Jacobs motioned for the production of the documents because the hearing was already over 
and sanctions were ordered. Jacobs argued that the fact that the district court made its decision 
post-hearing does not impair Sands' production requirements under NRS 50.125(1).  After noting 
FRE 612 was a rule of evidence and not one of discovery, the Court determined that 
permitting such an untimely motion would encourage the types of "fishing expeditions" that both 
the Nevada Legislature and Congress sought to avoid.  
Here, the district court turned NRS 50.125 into a discovery tool that has no relation to 
testing any witness's credibility as evidenced by its assertion that “once a document is used by a 
witness to refresh his recollection, then that document is subject to discovery.” That reading 
of NRS 50.125 ignores the "at the hearing" language. Thus, the district court abused its 
discretion by requiring the production of the documents after it entered its order. Jacobs should 
have notified the court it had to rule at the hearing or submitted his motion immediately 
following the hearing. 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 H.R. Rep. No. 93-650, at 13 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7086. 
8 See Wardleigh,	  111	  Nev.	  at	  354-­‐55,	  891	  P.2d	  at	  1186 (indicating that the "attorney-client privilege is waived when 
a litigant places information protected by it in issue through some affirmative act for his own benefit" (internal 
quotations omitted)).	  
Conclusion  
 
The Court held that a witness's review of purportedly privileged documents prior to 
testifying constitutes a waiver of any privilege under NRS 50.125.  However, in this case, the 
adverse party failed to assert this waiver at or near the hearing in question and instead waited 
until well after the district court had entered its order. Thus, the demand was untimely under NRS	  
50.125(1). Accordingly, the Court granted petitioners' request for a writ of prohibition to halt the 
production of the purportedly privileged documents. 
